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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
EUGENE WILLIAMS,
vs.

Plaintiff and Appellant,

LON ROTHEY, et al,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the ruling of the Trial Court
rlPnYing plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings to
conform to the facts. This appeal is based upon the
following grounds :
Point 1. The evidence warranted a finding that the
defendants were guilty of wilful and wanton negligence
in maintaining a dangerous condition on their premises.
Point 2. The amendment was timely because the
Motion to Amend was pennitted by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Point 3. The amendment vrns merely an addition to
a cause set forth in the pre-trial order.
STATEMENT OF, THE FACTS
rrhe plaintiff, a 36-year-old man, married with six
children ('rr. 56) was employed on April 4, 1963, as a
driver salesman for the Ogden Distributing Company.

(Tr. 56) On that date, plaintiff was ordered to deliver
beer to the defendants' premises to be used by the Junior
Chamber of Commerce at their election meeting (Tr. 57i.
'J1his he did about 5 :30 p.m. (Tr. 57). Subsequ1·ntl~-, at
about 9 :00 p.m., he returned to see if the equipmert wa~
working satisfactorily (Tr. 58). He couldn't use thi·
regular entrance by reason of the crowd and asked an
employee of the defendants if there was another entrance
(Tr. 60). He was directed to a passageway and advised
that there might be a trap door (Tr. 60). He procef'ded
down the passageway safely-he had to stop and move
a piece of plywood-(Tr. 140). He proceeded to tht
area of the meeting, adjusted the keg and started back
down the hall (Tr. 61). When he came to the piece of
plywood he again moved it, took a step and fell into
an unlighted, unguarded hole into the basement (Tr. 61).
The Treasurer of the Junior Chamber of Commerce (Tr. 81) testified that he frequently used that
possageway (Tr. 32). That he had never seen a trap
door-did not know of its existence prior to the incident
in question (Tr. 35). He had never seen any signs (Tr.
36-47) or lights (Tr. 37-46). He stated it was like a tunnel. (Tr. 37) although he had observed a piece of plywood
in the passageway prior theretofore (Tr .. 48.). This was
confirmed by another Ogden businessman (Tr. 53, 54,

55).

The defendants conceded that the plywood was
loose-it was not hinged nor could it be locked (Tr. 22~
23), although subsequent to this event he installed both
hinges and locks (Tr. 22).
2

Tlw defendants and their employees knew that pat rrn1~ an<l guests used the passageway for their own
Jllll']HJses (Tr. 26, 146, 147, 189) and this was not unusual
(Tr. 190)

rrhe employee of the defendants, who was in charge
of the premises at the time, stated that after the plaintiff
had gone through she replaced the plywood (Tr. 140).
Thereafter someone opened the trap door (Tr. 142) and
1d1Pn open it created a dangerous condition (Tr. 140.
143, 147).
There was no contention that the opening was
lighted, either above or below, or that there were any
~uard rails or other safety devices to permit a person
to see the hole or to protect them from falling therein.
The plaintiff moved to amend the pleadings and
pn•-trial order by alleging wilful and wanton negligence
at the conclusion of plaintiff's case (Tr. 177); the plain
tiff again moved to amend at the conclusion of the
dPfendants' case (Tr. 202); the plaintiff submitted instructions in line with his theory (plaintiff's proposed
f nst!:uctions 4,5, and 6); and plaintiff moved for a new
trial because the Court refused to permit the amendments and plaintiff's requested instructions-all were
denied by the Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WARRANTED A

~-,IND

IN"G THAT THE DEFENDANTS vVERE
GUILTY OF WILFUL AND vYANTON NEG3

LIGENCE IN MAlN'l 1 Al~ING A DAKCEHOUS CONDITION ON THEIR PREillISES.
The jury could have found that the plainti:'.'f fp]]
down an unguarded trap door opening, situated i; 1 r:n
unlit passageway, hidden further by a piece of plywood.
They could also have found that he could see no si[Il,
tl
or \v'arning devices and that he, having traversed th"
pasageway safely minutes before, had no reason to su~
pect the existence of such a danger.
c

These facts so found would justify the jury in findthat a dangerous condition existed that constituted a
nuisance and that the defendants were guilty of wilful
and wanton negligence or misconduct.
Section 500 provides:

Restatement of the Law of Torts (2)

The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard uf
the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to
the other to do, knowing or having reason to bow
of facts which would lead a reasonable man to
realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another bnt
also that such risk is substantially greater than
that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
the comments thereunder, recognize that there must
be an awareness of the risk-but surely this knowledge
of the denfendants' agents, that the situation was dangerous, would be adequate to show awareness of risk~lthough the comment holds further, that knowledge of
danger is not required to be proved, it is enough to show
4

th;\t th(' ador knows of tht> high degree' of risk and
tli;1t ot!H'J'S ma~· lw t'X)lOSC'd.

Tlw

Court of 1-tah has not had occasion
ti l'~arninP this section in lig-M of thP facts herein, but
it has quokd S('etion 500 with apprnval in Wood v.
[1111/or. 8 Utah 2d 210, 332, P2d 215; Ferguson v.
J() 11 q ..:.man, 10 l~tah 2d 179, 350, P2d 404; and State v.
U('rclitord, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357, P2d 183.
~n1n·ernP

fn Greeian c. Soloman, \.Vash. 1955, 47 Wash. 2d

;;;).J., 287 P2d 721, the plaintiff fell in an excavation
il1lg hy clef< ndant's agents in an unlit and unguarded
0

·whPn cl(cfrnclant was found to have known that it
>!wn!d lHLY<' known pE~oplc wonld walk at the time, the
ilninti ff, a knant, was in the bark yard for the purpose
,1f deliwring refuse in a garLage can. The Supreme
C'nn:·t adopted the Rtstate1aent rule as set out in Secrinn :1PO and found that the above facts constituted wantn~1 mit:conduct.

;1rPa

Two ~·ears latPr tlw Supreme Court of Arizona, in
Busy Bee Buffet v. Farrell, 82 Ariz. 192, 310 P2d 817,
fnnnd the defendants were guilty of gross and ·wilful
rn!:::('onduct \vhen they had a trav door which extended
th<· width of a passag<";:::-::: and did not have adequate
i~nard rails or \rnrnings. It is said that such a situation
«n•ated a potential danger at all times and an actual
danger \dwn open and unguarded.
( )rpgon and California have both recognized that
the::.;p fact:-: constitute the maintenance of a dangerous
eondition. See Senner v. Danewolf, Ore. 6 P2d 240,

5

and Chance
P2d 185.

i;,

Lawry's, lnc., 24 Cal. RP11 R 209 ·)-,
'0/-t

The landlord removpd a railing from a vorz :1 froi::
which a guest fell-in Rossiter 'i·. Moore, \Ya::-;;:., 37
P.2d 250. The trial court granted a directed verdict
in favor of the landlord and defendant. This \ms i·t..
versed by the Supreme Court which followed Grc~etan
e. Soloman, supra, but which identified the acts not onh
as wanton misconduct as in Greetan v. Soloman, but
held that these acts constituted a nuisance, saying:
1

There is a wide distinction between act::-; lawful
in themselves, done by one upon his own premisP~.
which may result in injury to another if not properly done or guarded, and those which in thi
nature of things must so result. In the fornH'J
case a party could only be made liable for actual
negligence in the performance of the act or modt~
of maintaining it, while in the later case, h1
would be liable for all the consequences of hi.acts, whether guilty of negligence or not. Thi,
one act only becomes a nuisance by reason of the
negligent manner by which it is performed or
maintained, while the other is a nuisance iwr s1'.
Woods La\v of Nuisances, 2d Ed., 141.
In the instant case, it is admitted that
the landlord had full knowledge of the
condition of the premises at the time of
leasing.
This is in accord with our decisions: Greetan
v. Solomon, 47 vVash. 2d 354, 287 P.2d. 721; l\k
Courtie v. Bayton, 159 \Vash. 418, 29-l P. 238.
Cf. Marks v. Nimbil Realty Co., 2-1-5 N.Y. 256.
157 N.E. 129.
6

Thn." tlw Conrt Jwld that \\·ilful misecrnket an<l nn~
<lllC'<' 1n>I'<' in )pgal <>r-i'<'d th1• outgrowth of fop sarnP

and in lt>gal effrct at least, so far as these facts go,
;<l('nti<·al.
1wt'

Long lwfore tht- Restatement of Torts, the Supreme
( 'onrt of etah earnr: to tlw samP conelnsion. Jn Lar::;.on
, . ('nlrler's Park Company, 45 U. 325 180 P. 599, the plaintiff. ag<· eleven, lost the sight of an eye when he was hit
Ji, a hullet from a shooting gallery on premises owned by
tb· dPfond~u1t. The facts indicah•d that tlw defondant
b("\' the pn·rnises were to be so used and knew that
t lw \\alls of the gallery had holes, cracks and openings
111 it that would not stop a bnllet, and finally that the
,];.fp•1dant kne\Y that the path on which the paintiff
'·" <t:-i walking was in fact used by the public and visitors
'<1 the Park. The Court, speaking through Justice vVeber,
t'<:1~nd that the defendant had maintained a dangerous
c11nrlition and a nuisance and that the defendant was
~nhjecting the public to danger unless the gallery was
tr·paired and the walls \Vere protected. The judgment
fnr the plaintiff was sustained.
The defendants herein were guilty of wilful and
wanton misconduct and that they maintained a dangerous condition that constituted a nuisance. The facts supJ!'ll't a cause of action based upon either the requested
Llllt<~ndment or on the theory of nuisance, the legal effect
lieing the same.
POINT IL
11 HE 1IOTION" TO A~IEND WAS TIMELY
AKD PF_:Ri\IJTTED BY THE UTAH RULES

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
7

Ruk·s 15(a), (b), n:1d Li cl tlw Utah Ilnlt·~ oi' ('jy;I
Procedure mm;t be examined in order to determine if
the trial court abused its discrdion in refusing to allu\\
the phi.intiff to amend his pleadings. Rule Hi 1 1n,,- 1 d,~
that the court may direct a pretrial hearing for tlL· purlJOSe of simplifying the iswes and the handling of otht·i
matters which will aid in the disposition of the adion
being tried. The order issued by the court fro1a th;~
hearing lim;ts the trial to issues " . . . not dislJO."Pd ot
by the admissions and agreements of couns0l; an<l su('L
order when entPred controls tlH~ s::h cql.1ent courst· of
the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice." Since no procedure for modifying t!11·
pretrial order "to prevent mani.fest injustice" is sprr-'1fied in this section, it seems evident that Rule 15 whil'h
specifically provides for amended and supplemental
pleadings should be the rule to control any anwndmen:
to a pretrial order. It is difficult to undersb.nd ho'"
Rules 15(a) and (b), which allo1-v amendments durin:!
a trial, could be of any practical value unless they \YPr~·
intended not only to allow amendments to th2 pleading~
but also to any pretrial order that might be involved.
The court in Reich v. Christopidos 123 Vt. 137, 256 P.~d
238, 241 (1953) pointed this out when it said, "Rulf
15(b) U.R.C.P. provides for: ' . . . amendment of th~
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conforlll
to the evidence ... even after judgment ... ' and Rul~
16 provides that the pretrial order may be ' ... modified
at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.' It would be
anomalous if the pleadings could be so amended but
the pretrial order could not."
8
0

Tlll' sedion of Rule 15(a) which applit•s to thi::-; ease
i;-; thP ::;edion that says, "Otherwise a party may amend
'ii~ i1kadings only by leave of eourt or by written con>(•nt of tlw adverse party; and leave ::-;hall be freely
.::iwn "·hen justiC'e so requires." Rule 15(b) is but an
( nlnrgement of this clause. The court recognized this
11 1 ((o!'ltz L'. Coutincntal Bank and Trust Company 5
l't. :2d :20-1-, 299 P.2d 832, 835 (195G) where it said that
Htd(• 15(h) emphasized situations coming within the last
1,11·oyisinn of 15(a). Rules 15(a) and (b) can be con~1d1•l'(•d a::-; a single rule in determining the spirit in
'\Ii id1 the;,· are to be applied. Rules 1 (a), 8 ( f), and
:,.+ (('l\ll when considered in connection with rules 15(a)
anl1 (h) indicate that rules 15(a) and (h) should be
.1i1plied liberally. In Jackson v. Cope 1 U.2d 330, 26G
1i_:.:d 300, 503 (1954) the court in talking about amend11wnts to pleadings, cited with approval the following
:-tatrntent, " ... Amendments should be liberally allowe<l
in the interest of justice whenever it will aid in settling
an Pntire controversy. The limitatons thereon should be
\\·!'.ether the matters involved are such as can be connniPnt1y and effectively handled i.n one trial without
injm)· to substantive rights. . . ." The Federal court
has made similar statements in construing rules 15(a)
;end (lJ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
<1 rP substantially the same as Utah's rules.
In Lloyd
'. l'nited Liqnors Corp. 203 F.2d 789, 793 (6 Cir. 1953)
qt<' ('Ourt said, "Rule 15(a) ... provides that leave to
Ji i(' nmendmt>nts to pleadings 'shall be freely given when
justice ."O requires.' Rule 15(b) further evidences that
1mrpos<' of the rule makers to have been that material
9

m:1t>nch1u•nts shall lw f·.,' 1.1· c-''.(J\\'< d to aecopq 1 Ji~Ji thi
pn•sentation of an action on its nwrits .... Th<> tPnd.Pn(·\
of tlw federal courts have heen consistently towar;l
greah•r lilwrality in the allmrnnce of amL rnL (' .:
pleadings. . . . '' Similar statements were made in Pick.
ford Corp. v. De Luxe Laboratories 1G9 F. Supp. 11~.
120 (Cal. D.C. 1958) and Stafford v. Roacltcay Turns.I
Co. 70 F. Supp. 555, 5G5 (Penn. D.C. 19-17). 11 hc· court
in Staf(ord S((Jd, "Amrndments should be allowed with
great liberality at any stage of the case ... oth< nrisi·
justice would be defeated through a mere mistake as to
the form or title of the action."
1

1

Rule 15 (b) consists of two sections. The first concerns the treatment of issues which are tried by implied
or expressed consent of the other party and the second
concerns the allowance of amendments when the other
party obpects to evidence which is being presented. ThiE
last section does not apply to this case since the defendant did not object to the introduction of the evidence
given rise to the proposed amendment. However, thi~
section does point out the conditions under which the
court should in justice allow an amendment.
There have been cases in ·which the court has allmreJ
amendments by implied consent under circumstance~
similar to those at issue herein. In Draper v. J. B. & R. E
TValkcr, Inc.J 121 Ut. 567, 244 P.2d 360 (1952) the court
ruled on evidence concerning a right-of-way ew:1 thougb
the pleadings were based on the issue of nuisance, did
not refer to the right-of-way, and were not amended tL'
bring the issue up. In ElPaso Electric Co. v. Su.rrency.
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the dd'endant was clrnrged
th 01wwting- a dPfodive truek on th!:' road. During
·!1·.· trial <'\.· dPm·e \ms intrnducPd which t-stablished that
:.11!' 1kfrndant's cm11loye1's operated the truck with knowl,•11;.;(· o!' its condition, and so the conrt held that the
.~:-:rn" which was produced by tlw d<>fendant, was con:-:1·ntPtl to by tlH• df'fendant, and the conrt instructed the
j\11·:· on tltP i:-:sl~<'. Tn Curro? r. Ilorrison, .+9 F. Supp.
~'-::; (Y<1. D.C. 19.+3) the plaintiff brought an action
:1[!,·:w1st th<' defrndant for his negligence which rC'sulted
l' ;1 1lPath fr'.lrn an automobile accident. The court found
1 liat tlw def1•rnlant had been negligent in allowing an
nu:1•nt to drive a cai· while under the influence of liquor.
'i.l:" plaintiff had not alleged this theory of negligence
!11;t thl' «omt held that since the defendant had not
(1li,1Pl'k(l to the evidence being introduced, the court under
rn]1• l:J(h) could rule on the evidence. June T. Inc. v.
i\.•11. 1, 290 F.2d -1-04 (5 Cir. 19Gl) concerned a negligence
m·t:on hrougbt on the grounds that a ship was unsea\\'l)rthy because of defective parts and equipment. Dur;ng- tht> trial the cvidPnce showed that three men were
nPPCTf'd to run the ship and so the court ruled that the
elf.fondant was negligent because he only provided a
t\\·o-rnan crew. The com·t assumed implied consent to
miw!1d the complaint. In Hall v. Nation.a,[ Supply Co.,
:.!/() F.2d 379 ( 5 Cir. 1959) an action of negligence was
])]'(rnght against the driver of a car which was in an
Hl·ei<lt>nt. During the trial, evidence came out to the
( t'f\•et that tlw defendant had been drinking. The court
:-:aid this issue was tried by implied consent and there\'orp allowed an amendment. In the Stafford v. Roadway
l!;!J V~d -P-1 ( 10 Cir. 1;q~)
.- 1

1

11

Tra11sit Co., supra, the court took notice of PvidPnC:l' tliat
a truck driver was negligent in operating a truek PYell
thongh the plaintiff's adion Was based On nno·L,ri
'-r ,_,, 1](·,.
which occurred while the truck was not in mof" ')TI • Tl It•
plaintiff did not ask for an amendment, so the (·ouri
must have ruled on the issue because of implied consPnt.

The above cases indicate that the court should find,
in the instant case, that the issue of wilful misC'onduet
was raisPd and that the defendant impliedly conscntt•d tu
it being made an issue. It is possible that the defendant
realized that no new issue was Leing raised, and did
not object because he did not want to bring the plaintiff\
attention to it, or because he did not want the plaintiff
to seek an amendment under the second part of Ruh
15(b). \~Yhile this possibility is remote, it is something
that should be considered in determining if the defendant
impliedly consented to the evidence introduced.
Even if the defendant did not impliedly con8ent to
the introduction of a new issue, the spirit of rules 15(al
and (h) would indicate that the plaintiff still should
he able to amend his complaint. As has already been
pointed out, the courts have held that rules 15(a) and
(b) are to be liberally construed to allow amendments.
The Utah court has said that an amendment should be
allowed as long as the defendant is not prejudiced in
presenting his defense or his substantive rights in some
other way injured. Jackson v. Cope, supra, p. 503; Keller
r. Gerber, 114 Utah 345, 199 P.2d 562, 565 (1948), Gralwrn 1'. Street, 109 Utah 460, 166 P.2d 52-±, 527 (19±6):
Hartford Accident and Indeniinity Co. v. Clegg, 103

12

i·tuh -tl-L l:l;J P.2d 919, 92:3 (1943); Wells v. Wells, 2

:2-+:2, :27:2 l'.:2d 167, 170 (1954). The ~"'eferal Courts
''""" ;d,.:o held that an amendment to the pleadings
:--hm:ld hP allmn·d as long as it does not work an injustice
'o t}w dPfendant. Stafford v. Roadirny Transit Co.,
:;npra, p. 5G5, Fli-Fab, Inc. v. United States, 16 F.R.D.
,) ...i:j, :>56 (R.I.D.C. 1954).
1

·.~d

Th<' df•fendant C'annot claim injustice just because
11<· i:-: n•quired to face an issue which he would rather
~LYoid. In Scott v. Baltimore and 0.R. Co., 151 F.2d 61,

(:)rd Cir. 1945) the dPfendant was charged with neglii~Pnre undPr the> Federal Employees Liability Act and
the Safety Appliance Act. The court took notice of
tlw Boiler Inspection Act and charged the jury thereon.
The court said, "We may assume, arguendo, that the
plaintiff started his action on one theory which his
proof did not support. Then the proof, we may assume,
sustained recovery on another ground. It is true that
tlw pleadings could then be amended to conform to the
proof, but obviously this would mean no satisfaction to
tllP defendant. The only injustice to the defendant in
such a situation is when he is compelled to go on with
thP trial and meet a new point which is a surprise to
him and on which he has had no opportunity to prepare."
The plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce
Uw issue of wilful and wanton misconduct. The plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings was made at the
1;.~

Pn<l of his presentation of evidence and before the de-

frndant had in any way committed himself. If the def(·ndant wa:::; surprised by the new issue and needed more
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t;nw to prPpm·p a clPf<.1::<~\ \;li:c'h i:; not lik(•[y :"inc·<· 11
1
same \\·i tn Ps:sps and clevidence would have been depended
npon Ji:.· the defendant, then he should have requPstr(l a
continuance' to allow hi1d to prepan~ a proper d1·; . 11 ~,
•

11 1

ThPrPfore, thP defo11dant would not have been ~1n'Jli
ditPd r1.\· the prnposc~d amendment.

The com·ts ;u sollH' cases haYP held thD.t an alli~·nd111ent to the pleadings 11rnst not introduce a new cau~e
c1 f arr en. (" tnh C;;nrts have l'('('.0[1;n ;'.·~('d t}!is rnk In
If art.ford Acri,cle11i und Iudenrnify Co. r. Clcg[!, supra,
a ca~w v;hid1 occurred hv1o~e the p1esent Ctr-Ji Euh·~ ol
Civil Procedure -.,,·e1·e ado1Jted, the court allowPd th
pla:11tiff to a11wnd his plead:ngs after all thr evidern·1•
had bet•n suh111itkcl. The plaintiff had based his aeLio11
nn a $:?0,000 bo:1d agree11wnt but then sought to amend
his pleacl;ngs so that he could base his action on a $10,000
hond agreement. The court recognized that an entirely
new cause of action could not be introducPd hut ~a 11
that this only meant that the defendant could not b~
:c~]-:(•d to faee a whole different and distinct legal ohl:µ-ntion. In this case the facts needed to show the hrea('h
of one contract ,,·ere thP io.ame that were needed to sho11
the breach of the other. The court said that a cause
of action can give rise to innumerable rights and so they
should Le considered in light of convenient, efficient
trial worl~ ,,-hich would lead to a full hearing of tlw
llH-'rits of the ontire controversy based on a "ompletl'
;_tdjudieation of the facts and not the pleadings. In
(~mhrrm r. 8trl'et, supra, p. 527, the court eitrd the

1lartford ea::-:e with approval and said that it lwld that
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nl'W eaust- of action whp1·e thP npw matters
on'·'· ". . . <'ll la rgP on tlw facts to J>rPsent a series of
·. 1 :rn~.aetions all gt>rmane and forming a conntich'd wholP
rdkding the mannPr in which the plaintiff was injured .
. . ." Tn Jackson 1'. Cope, supra, p. 50:1, a case decided
;Jte>r the aecqitance of the Utah Rules of Civil Proi·1·1lnre, tlw court said that the matter of amending a
.11\<·adinµ:
. would lw clearC'r if we omit entirely. the tenn
"1.·amw of ~rtion." In lVclls v. lVells, supra, p. 170, the
.. onrt in an aetion by the plaintiff to get alimony and
:·lt:ld ~npport. which was denied, allowed the plaintiff
tn a111t>nd at tht> end of the trial to collect past child
o:npport. The court said the amendment was in a technieal sense a new cause of action but that it was not
, '"·holly different cause of action or legal obligation
~inc·1 :t \Yas the same legal obligation from the same
l'an·nt to the same chid. The court said the amendment
11·a~ in C"onformance with the evidence and was such that
d C"ould be conveniently handled to settle the entire
r·ont roversy without injuring the defendant's substantive
rights. It seems clear from these cases that the Utah
'.·ourt rralizes that the term "cause of action" has little
rahw and that as long as a new issue arises out of the
Hlllle factual situation and can be conveniently handled,
it should be allowed by an amendment to the pleadings.
t lii·r(·

\Yas

no

The federal courts have also considered the introduction of a new cause of action by an amendment. In Lloyd
1. United Liquor Corp., supra, p. 793, the court said,

"ThP Supreme Court of the United States has fixed the
linub of iwrmissible amendment with increasing liber-
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ality and has ruled that a ck111ge of the legal thron 11 :·
th•' adion is no long0r accepted as a test of the ~ro:
priety of a proposed anwndment." In Vol. 3, Jloor'.,
Federal Practice ~ 15.13 (2) p. 98-1- the author ~:aid thnr
''Rule 15 (b) has rejected any concept that such amen(lments are barred if they result in a changp of the plain.
tiff's 'cause of action' . . . The fact that this innJlw~
a change in the nature of the cause of action, or tlw legal
theory of the action is immaterial so long as the oppo~
iing party has not been prejudiced in presenting hi~
case." In Blair v. Durham, 13-1- F.'..?<l 729, 731 (Gth Cir.
19-13) the court held that where the plaintiff alleg(•d
negligence of the defendant's workmen in letting a piece
of wood fall from a scaffold and strike the plaintiff.
but then amended under 15 (a) during the trial of alleged
negligent construction of the scaffold, the new theory of
negligence did not introduce a new cause of adion lwcause " ... the cause of action alleged grows ont of tht·
same transaction and is basically the same or is identical
in the essential elements upon which the right to su"
is based and upon which the defendant's duty to perform
is alleged to have arisen." The court also said, ''A cause
of action is the unlawful violation of a right or failurP
to discharge a duty which the facts show."
Here the alleged new theory grows out of the samr
transaction and the same duty owed by the defendant.
It could be conveniently handled in one trial without
prejudice to the defendant, therefore, it is not a new
''cause of action."
The above examination of the lmv and cast>s dearly
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,ho\\' that rules 15(a) and (b) as interpreted by the

i·onrts should permit an amendment by the plaintiff.
Tlw plaintiff made his motion at the end of his
presentation of evidence and did not seek to introduce
an:· 11e\Y evidence, the only interruption of the trial
i.drich ('Ould havP n'sulted would have heen the granting
of a eontinuance so that the defendant could prepare
to meet the new issue. However, rule 15(b) recognizes
this as a situation to be used in a case of this nature.
'l'he rule, therefore, clearly indicates that the necessity
of a continuance is not a ground upon which a motion
to amend should be denied.
Tlwre has been some specific language of the courts
( uncerning the denial of an amendment because of a
dela;.' in time. The court in Fli-Fab Inc. v. United States,
supra, p. 556, in response to a motion to amend which
was made before the trial said, "The primary question
for the consideration of this court is whether the allowance of the proposed amendment will work an injustice
npon the plaintiff and the timeliness of the motion for
]Pave to amend is one of the elements to be considered.
However, in and of itself, delay is not enough to warrant
tlw denial of such a motion. It must be shown that to
allow the amendment will result in prejudice to the
(lppositf' party." In Arm.strong Cork Co. v. PattersonSargent Co., 10 F.R.D. 534 (Ohio D.C. 1950), the court
in eonsidering the timeliness of a motion said, "Time
of itself is not important. Other reasons must attach
· · . " The court in Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co.,
::;urpa, p .. 565, said "Amendments should be allowed with
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trreat liberality. at am'}
sta,,.e
of the case • . . • " A smu
· ·1ar
•
n
statement was made by the court in Blair v. Durham
supra, p. 731, when it said, "Rule 15(a) ... providE;
that a party may amend his pleadings by leavp of th"
court, which leave shall be freely given when justiee ~ 11
requires at any time during the proceedings . ... "

h

Tlwre are a number of cases which indicate by their
holdings that a delay in amending a complaint is n1,1
a reason for denying an amendment. The following l'tah
<'.Uses have so indicated.
In Jackson i:. Cope, ::;upra, the court allov;ed th
plair:tiff to ame11d his pleadings from tort to asswup 8it
after he rested his case. The court said this was allowed
berause the amendment conformed to the evidene1>, it
did not injure the plaintiff's substantive rights, and it
was in the furtherance of justice. In J( eller i;. Gcrl!t'I
supra, tlH• plaintiff moved to amend after he had pn~
on his evidence to allege ownership of a truck in a cla:n
::md delivery action. The court allowed it. In Graham 1.
St re et, supra, the court allowed the plaintiff during the
trial to amend his pleadings from a charge of a n'f'aki
trant partner to one of a defrauding partner. In Hartford Accident and Inde1nnity Co. i-. Clegg, supra, thf
court allowed the plaintiff to amend at the close of hi~
evidence to allege a different bond agreement that tht
one he pleaded. And in Wells v. Tl' ells, supra, the court
allowed the plaintiff to change her action at the end
of the trial from one to secure alimony and child support
tn one to collect past child support.
1

The Federal Courts' holdings have been similar to
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of tlw l:tah C'ourts. ln Great Atlantic and Pacific
J, ,, Co. c. Jo11es, 177 F.2d 166, 167 (4th Cir. 1949) the
plaintiff brought an action for negligence of her emplo~·t'r in hitting her with a truck. At the end of all
1 ]i,, testimony she was allowed to amend to allege that
~he ,,·as injured by a case which had fallen from the
1nwk onto her. In Hall v. National Sitpply Co., supra,
i·YidPnce that the defendant had been drinking before
an accident occurred, came out during the trial. ThereJ',1rt>, tlw court allowed the charge of negligence to be
:nnPndecl to include that of driving while intoxicated
ln ~'ru:man v. Zinn, 164 F.2d 558 (3rd Cir. 1947) the
plaintiff brought an action for negligence against a doc
tor for negligently performing an operation on the plaindf\ foot. During the trial evidence came out which
1.·:-tahlished that the negligence was in the doctor's diagnosis. The plaintiff sought to amend but the trial court
11·ould not allow it and gave the defendant a non-suit at
tlH' end of the plaintiff's evidence. The appellant court
owrruled the trial court and said that the amendment
:;hould have been allowed. In Pickford Corp. v. DeLuxe
Laboratories, supra, the court allowed the defendant to
amend at the end of his evidence to include a statute
of limitations which had not been pleaded.
iLn:-w

These cases clearly show that the Utah courts, as
wt-ll as the federal courts, feel that a motion to amend
during a trial or even at the end of a trial, is timely
a~ long as it does not injure the other party's substantive
rights and it is in the furtherance of justice. Here the
defendant's substantive rights would not have been m-
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jurt>d. The motion to arncnd should have been grant ea.·

POINT III.
THE AMENDMENT WAS ~IEHELY AN AJJ_
DITION TO A CA USE SET FORTH IN THB
PRE-TRIAL ORDER.
The pre-trial order provided: ''That the act:- (1t
the defrndants, its agents and employees, in permittin~
an unguarded trap door to remain open created a nuis
ance on thP defendant's premises."
The faets herein clearly show that the plaintiff pr•1
duced ample evidence that the jury could so find. Ro'siteer v. Moore, supra, Larsen v. Calder's Pork C1 ..
supra.
The legal duty of the defendant as crPated by ;:
nuisance and the legal effect of wilful and wanton neg-Ji
gence - misconduct is the same. They are set forth in
plaintiff's requested but denied instructions.
The facts, the duty and its responsibilities are identiC'al, and it is submitted all are includable under either
the pre-trial order or the requested amendments.

CONOLUSION
The judgment and order of the trial court should
he reversed. To do otherwise is to give the plaintiff
less than full justice and is to afford the defendants a
refuge to which they are not entitled.
20

li!' no ela;m of 1-lUrpnsP. Tlw k•gal de'"''" lhc'•'.'·,'-'<ll,\ for a (l('fomw to nuisan<'(' is identical
r 1o;;l' r(•q nire<l for wilful and wanton negligence.
11
'JJ:,•:::• fad;; Y1t'n' at all times known to the defendants.
r'.) lH'l'lllit tl1!;-; .~ndgrnl'nt to stand is to perpetrate injus, 1·1' rathf'r than to rPnder justice.
TlH·n·

c<lll

J

Respectfully suhmitted,

C. C. PATERSON

Attorney for Appellant
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